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Abstract
We propose a revised version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-period games with
observed actions. In nite games, perfect Bayesian equilibria are weakly consistent and subgame
perfect Nash equilibria. In general games that allow a continuum of types and strategies, however,
perfect Bayesian equilibria might not satisfy these criteria of rational solution concepts. To solve
this problem, we revise the denition of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium by replacing Bayesrule
with a regular conditional probability. We call this revised solution concept a perfect regular
equilibrium. Perfect regular equilibria are always weakly consistent and subgame perfect Nash
equilibria in general games. In addition, perfect regular equilibria are equivalent to simplied
perfect Bayesian equilibria in nite games. Therefore, the perfect regular equilibrium is an extended
and simple version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-period games with observed
actions.
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1 Introduction
We propose a revised version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-period
games with observed actions. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) formulated the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in the setting of nite games that allow only a nite number of types and strate-
gies. In nite games, this perfect Bayesian equilibrium satises criteria of rational solution
concepts such as weak consistency and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition.
However, it might not satisfy these criteria in general games that allow a continuum of types
and strategies. To solve this problem with the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we revise its
denition by replacing Bayesrule with a regular conditional probability. We refer to this
revised version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the perfect regular equilibrium. We
show that it satises these criteria of rational solution concepts in general multi-period games
with observed actions. In addition, this perfect regular equilibrium is equivalent to a simple
version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in nite games. Therefore, we conclude that the
perfect regular equilibrium extends the perfect Bayesian equilibrium into general games as
a simple version of it.
In game theory, most of the solution concepts were developed as renements of the Nash
equilibrium introduced by Nash (1951). The Nash equilibrium, as the most popular solution
concept, embodies the behavior of rational players. So, it consists of a set of strategies for
each player such that each strategy is the best response to the other strategies. This Nash
equilibrium became known as a compelling condition for rational strategies, and thus it
became a necessary condition for rational solution concepts. However, the Nash equilibrium
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was dened in strategic form games in which all players chose their strategies once and
simultaneously. Hence, this solution concept might not properly predict playersbehavior in
multi-period games where players choose their actions in each period after observing actions
taken before. In multi-period games, players could also have di¤erent incentives in di¤erent
periods. Since the Nash equilibrium requires all players to decide what actions they should
take once and simultaneously, it might not reect these changes in incentives in multi-period
games. As a result, a Nash equilibrium could include incredible threats.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by Selten (1975) improved the Nash equilibrium.
The basic idea behind this solution concept was to break a whole game into subgames
and to nd Nash equilibria in every subgame. When we analyze each of the subgames
separately, we are able to consider players incentives within those subgames. Thus, if
situations in di¤erent periods lead to the formation of di¤erent subgames, then the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium could reect di¤erent incentives in di¤erent periods in multi-period
games. As a result, it could exclude incredible threats1 . Here, subgames can be regarded
as complete units in the analysis of games in that we can nd Nash equilibria, which reect
players rational behavior, within subgames without referring to any information outside
those subgames. In games with incomplete information, however, these complete units of
analysis are too large to catch each of the playersincentives separately. So, the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium might fail to reect playersincentives in di¤erent periods.
1 To nd a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in practice, it is convenient to analyze subgames from back
to front. This is because, by analyzing backward, we can naturally consider playersfuture incentives in any
period. In this sense, we may think the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a combination of the Nash
equilibrium and backward induction.
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Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium introduced by Kreps and Wilson
(1982) improved the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. These solution concepts break a
whole game into information sets and search strategies that satisfy sequential rationality at
each information set. The sequential rationality is a condition for the strategies of rational
players and requires that each strategy be the best response to the other strategies at each
of the information sets. This sequential rationality, therefore, inherits the spirit of the Nash
equilibrium condition. As units of analysis in multi-period games, information sets are small
enough to catch each of the players incentives separately. Consequently, these solution
concepts could reect di¤erent incentives in di¤erent periods in multi-period games, and thus
they could exclude incredible threats. Particularly in nite games, these solution concepts
can exclude all of the incredible threats. In general games that allow a continuum of types
and strategies, however, these solution concepts might cause more serious problems than
including incredible threats because of their new approaches through information sets.
Information sets can be regarded as the smallest units of analysis. In games, players
cannot distinguish decision points in a common information set. So, whatever action they
choose, the same action must be applied to all decision points in a common information
set. That is, players can choose only one action at each of their information sets. Hence,
information sets would be the smallest units used to analyze playersrational behavior.
These smallest units of analysis, however, might be smaller than complete units of analy-
sis. For this reason, we might need more information to nd rational strategies at each
information set. In games, su¢ cient information to nd rational strategies at each of the
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information sets encompasses playersbeliefs regarding probability distributions over infor-
mation sets. Accordingly, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and the sequential equilibrium
require the playersbeliefs to be part of these solution concepts themselves. Note that these
solution concepts embody playersrationalities in games. Therefore, the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium and the sequential equilibrium propose conditions for rational beliefs as they
propose sequential rationality, which is the condition for rational strategies.
In general games, however, those conditions for rational beliefs might cause problems
with these solution concepts. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium and the sequential equi-
librium propose reasonability and consistency, respectively, as their conditions for rational
beliefs. These conditions are dened based on Bayesrule. However, Bayesrule has limited
application in practice and this limited application could result in these solution concepts
being incapable of satisfying the criteria of rational solution concepts in general games. In
this paper, we propose two criteria of rational solution concepts in general games, namely,
weak consistency and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition. Therefore, the lim-
ited application of Bayesrule might mean that these solution concepts are unable to satisfy
the weak consistency and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition in general games.
The weak consistency is a criterion of the rational beliefs that places restrictions only on
the beliefs on the equilibrium path. This condition for weak consistency is a requirement for
all criteria related to rational beliefs. Thus, it is a necessary condition for rational beliefs.
However, it is weak in that it does not locate any restriction on the beliefs o¤ the equilibrium
path. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition, on the other hand, is a criterion
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of the rational strategies. It places restrictions on all actions on the equilibrium path.
Moreover, it sets restrictions on some of the actions o¤ the equilibrium path, and in this way
it can indirectly inspect some of the beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Consequently, it can
compensate for the weakness of the weak consistency, and therefore these two conditions can
serve as the criteria of the rational solution concepts. In fact, the sequential rationality is also
known as an important criterion of the rational solution concepts in multi-period games. This
condition, however, is a requirement for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and the sequential
equilibrium. Furthermore, it is a requirement for our solution concept, namely, the perfect
regular equilibrium. So these solution concepts always satisfy the sequential rationality, and
thus we do not use this criterion to evaluate the rationality of these solution concepts.
Perfect regular equilibrium satises the weak consistency and the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium condition in general games, and thus it solves the incapability problem with the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium and the sequential equilibrium. The perfect regular equilibrium
is dened as a pair of beliefs and strategies such that the beliefs are updated from period to
period according to the regular conditional probability and taking the beliefs as given, no
player prefers to change its strategy at any of its information sets. So, the perfect regular
equilibrium still breaks a whole game into information sets and searches strategies that satisfy
sequential rationality at each of the information sets just as those two solution concepts do.
However, this solution concept denes its condition for rational beliefs as not being based
on Bayesrule, but rather on a regular version of the conditional probability. This regular
conditional probability does not have a limited application. Hence, the perfect regular
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equilibrium based on the regular conditional probability can always satisfy the two criteria
of the rational solution concepts in general games. Moreover, in nite games, the perfect
regular equilibrium is equivalent to a simple version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Therefore, this perfect regular equilibrium extends the perfect Bayesian equilibrium into
general games as a simple version of it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a general multi-period
game with observed actions. Section 3 provides a simple extension of the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in general games and then illustrates its incapability to satisfy the two criteria of
the rational solution concepts, namely, the weak consistency and the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium condition. Section 4 formally denes the perfect regular equilibrium. Finally,
Section 5 shows that every perfect regular equilibrium satises these two criteria of the
rational solution concepts and concludes that a perfect regular equilibrium is an extended
and simple version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-period games with
observed actions.
2 General multi-period game with observed actions
We adopt the multi-period games with observed actionsfrom Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
and adapt it to general games that allow innite actions and types, but only nite players.
Hence, like the game from Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), a general multi-period game with
observed actions is represented by ve items: players, a type and state space, a probability
measure on the type and state space, strategies, and utility functions. Based on these items,
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we dene two more items, namely, a system of beliefs and expected utility functionals. We
use all seven items to dene the solution concept, namely, the perfect regular equilibrium.
Finally, based on this setting of the general game, we extend the denitions of the Nash
equilibrium and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Consequently, this section is devoted
to dening the setting of the general multi-period game with observed actions and the basic
solution concepts.
In a general multi-period game with observed actions, there are a nite number of players
denoted by i = 1; 2; :::; I. Each player i has its type i 2 i and this type is its private
information as in Harsanyi (196768). In addition, there exists a state 0 2 0 and the
players do not have information about the actual state. Thus, each player has information
about its type i, but no information about the other playerstypes and the state  i 2  i =
0  (i0 6=ii0). We assume that  = Ii=0i is a non-empty metric space. Realizations 
2  are governed by a probability measure  on the class of the Borel subsets2 Ii=0ß(i)
of . Given playerstypes i, a conditional probability measure of  exists and is denoted
by  i : i  (j 6=iß(j))  ! [0; 1] so that for each i 2 i and B 2 j 6=iß(j),  i(i;B)
represents a probability of B given i.
The players play the game in periods t = 1; 2; :::; T where T 2 N [ f1g. In each period
t, all players simultaneously choose actions, and then their actions are revealed at the end of
the period. We assume, for simplicity, that each players available actions are independent
of its type so that each player is action space in period t is Ati regardless of its type. In
2 Given a metric space X, the class of the Borel sets ß(X) is the smallest class of subsets of X such that
i) ß(X) contains all open subsets of X and ii) ß(X) is closed under countable unions and complements.
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addition, we assume that At = Ii=1Ati is a non-empty metric space3 for each t. Finally, we
consider only the perfect recall games introduced by Kuhn (1950).
A strategy is dened as follows. For each i = 1; :::; I and t = 1; :::; T , let ti be a measure
from i A1     At 1ß(Ati) to [0; 1]. Then, a behavioral strategy i is an ordered list
of measures i = (
1
i ; :::; 
T
i ) such that 1) for each (i; a
1; :::; at 1) 2 i  A1      At 1,
ti(i; a
1; :::; at 1; ) is a probability measure on ß(Ati) and 2) for every B 2 ß(Ati), ti(;B)
is ß(i)  (t 1t0=1Ii0=1ß(At
0
i0)) measurable. The condition 1) requires that each 
t
i(i; a
1;
:::; at 1; ) specify what to play at each information set if(i; a1; :::; at 1)g. The condition
2) requires that ti allow a well-dened expected utility functional, which is dened later.
Hereafter, we simply call a behavioral strategy a strategy. Let i be the set of strategies
for player i and let  be the set of strategy proles, that is,  = Ii=1i. Note that these
denitions originated from Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Balder (1988) and are adapted
to the general multi-period games with observed actions.
A system of beliefs is a set of probabilistic assessments about other playerstypes condi-
tional on reaching each of the information sets. It therefore consists of conditional probability
measures over each of the information sets and each measure denotes playersbeliefs about
the otherstypes given actions taken before and private information on their own types. Its
formal denition is similar to that for the strategy. For each i and t, let ti be a measure on
iA1 At 1(j 6=iß(j)) into [0; 1]. In addition, for each t, let t denote (t1; :::; tI).
Then, a system of beliefs  is an ordered list of measures  = (1; :::; T ) such that 1) for
3 Therefore, the space   A1      AT is a non-empty metric space. On this space, expected utility
functionals are well-dened according to Ash (1972, 2.6).
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each (i; a1; :::; at 1) 2 i  A1      At 1, ti(i; a1; :::; at 1; ) is a probability measure
on j 6=iß(j) and 2) for every B 2 j 6=iß(j), ti(;B) is ß(i)  (t 1t0=1Ii0=1ß(At
0
i0)) mea-
surable. Here, the condition 1) requires that each ti(i; a
1; :::; at 1; ) specify a probability
distribution of other playerstypes over the information set  i  f(i; a1; :::; at 1)g. The
condition 2) requires that ti allow a well-dened expected utility functional. Let 	 be the
set of all systems of beliefs. Then, an element4 (; ) in 	  is called an assessment.
AVon Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for player i is dened as Ui : A1AT
 ! R. We assume that each Ui is bounded above or bounded below and Ii=0ß(i) 
(Tt=1Ii=1ß(Ati)) measurable, which guarantees that Ui is integrable. In addition, we assume
that each Ui can be expressed as a sum of nite-period utility functions. Formally, for each Ui,
we assume that there exist both a partition fKg    of f1; 2; :::; Tg and its associated nite-
period utility functions UK :  (k2KAk)  ! R such that Ui(; a) =
P
K2  U
K(; aK) for
every (; a) 2 A1     AT where aK = (ak)k2K 2 k2KAk. Here, the partition   is a
disjoint collection of non-empty subsets K of f1; 2; :::; Tg such that [K2 K = f1; 2; :::; Tg.
These two assumptions ensure the existence of a well-dened expected utility functional.
An expected utility functional for player i is implicitly dened as a unique function Ei :
  ! R (= R [ f 1;1g) satisfying the following two conditions given any arbitrary
strategy prole . First, if Ei() is nite, then for any " > 0, there exist both a period t0  T
4 For each i and t, the measures ti(; ) and ti(; ) are known as transition probabilities. For more
information on the transition probability, please refer to Neveu (1965, III), Ash (1972, 2.6), and Uglanov
(1997).
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and a sequence of actions (at
0+1; :::; aT ) 2 At0+1      AT such that for any t  t0,
j Ei() 
R

R
A1
R
At
Ui(; a
1; :::; at 1; at; at+1; :::; aT )t(; a1; :::; at 1; dat)1(; da1)(d) j< "
where for each t, t denotes the product measure of ft1; :::; tIg onIi=1ß(Ati), that is, t = t1
    tI . Second, if Ei() is innite, then for any M 2 N, there exist both a period t0  T
and a sequence of actions (at
0+1; :::; aT ) 2 At0+1      AT such that for any t  t0,
R

R
A1
   R
At
Ui(; a
1; :::; at 1; at; at+1; :::; aT )t(; a1; :::; at 1; dat)    1(; da1)(d)
> M when Ei() =1 and <  M when Ei() =  1.
This denition of the expected utility functional makes sense according to Ash (1972, 2.6)5 .
In this denition of the expected utility functional, the necessity of the second assumption
on the utility function, which is that the utility functions Ui can be expressed as sums of
nite-period utility functions UK , that is, Ui =
P
K2  U
K , might not be clearly seen This
assumption is necessary to well-dene an expected utility functional because the denition
uses nitely iterated integrals. The following example shows that without this assumption,
we might not be able to dene an expected utility functional. Consider a game with just
one player. Let a function U : f; g1  ! f0; 1g be a utility function for the player such
that for any a 2 f; g1, U(a) = 0 if a contains innitely many , otherwise U(a) = 1.
5 Let zj be a    field of subsets of 
j for each j = 1; :::; n. Let 1 be a probability measure on z1,
and for each (!1; :::; !j) 2 
1      
j , let (!1; :::; !j ;B), B 2 zj+1, be a probability measure on zj+1
(j = 1; 2; :::; n  1). Assume that (!1; :::; !j ;C) is measurable for each xed C 2 zj+1. Let 
 = 
1    

n and z = z1     zn.
(1) There is a unique probability measure  on z such that for each measurable rectangle A1     An
2 z, (A1     An) =
R
A1
R
A2
   R
An
(!1; ::: ; !n 1; d!n)   (!2; d!1)1(d!1).
(2) Let f : (
;z)  ! (R;ß(R)) and f  0. Then, R


fd =
R

1
  R

n
f(!1; ::: ; !n)(!1; ::: ; !n 1; d!n)  
1(d!1).
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Suppose the player chooses its strategy  such that 1) 1() = 1() = 1
2
and 2) for any
t  2, t(a1; :::; at 1;) = 1 if at 1 =  and t(a1; :::; at 1; ) = 1 if at 1 = . Then, the
expected utility value with respect to  is obviously 1
2
. However, according to our denition
of the expected utility functional E, E() cannot be 1
2
since E(0) = 0 or 1 for any arbitrary
strategy 0. Accordingly, we cannot dene an expected utility functional for this game. In
fact, this assumption regarding the utility function is a weak requirement in that it is always
satised in nite-period games and also satised in repeated games that consist of innitely
repeated nite-period games. Nevertheless, this assumption is so potent that we can dene
an expected utility functional by using only nitely iterated integrals.
Based on this expected utility functional, the Nash equilibrium by Nash (1951) and the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by Selten (1975) are extended in the general multi-period
games with observed actions. In this paper, we suggest two conditions for rational solution
concepts in the general games. One is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition. The
other is weak consistency introduced by Myerson (1991, 4.3). This weak consistency is a
criterion of a consistent relation between playersbeliefs and playersactual strategies. A
formal denition of the weak consistency is presented in Section 5.
Denition 1 A strategy prole  = (1; :::; I) is a Nash equilibrium if  satises Ei() =
max0i2i Ei(
0
i;  i) for each i  I. A Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect if it induces a
Nash equilibrium in every subgame6 .
6 For a formal denition of the subgame, please refer to Selten (1975, Section 5).
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3 Example: Incapable simple perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium in a general game
This section shows that an extension of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-
period games with observed actions might be incapable of satisfying the weak consistency
and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition. We rst provide a simple and for-
mal extension of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general games. Originally, the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium was dened in nite games. However, it has been extended and ap-
plied to general games on various economic issues, such as the Auction, Bargaining game,
and Signaling game. Here, we try to present a universal denition of the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that can be commonly applied to such general games. Next, we describe the
setting of the example which is the famous signaling game by Crawford and Sobel (1982).
Then, based on this setting, we show that the simple extension of the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium might be incapable of satisfying the weak consistency and the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium condition.
3.1 Simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a general game
According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a nite game
is dened as an assessment (; ), which is a pair consisting of a system of beliefs  and a
strategy prole , such that (; ) is both 1) reasonable and 2) sequentially rational. Here, an
assessment (; ) is said to be reasonable i) if  is updated from period to period with respect
to  and  itself according to Bayesrule whenever possible and ii) if it satises the no-
signaling-what-you-dont-knowcondition that constrains  o¤ the equilibrium path which
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players would not reach if they would play according to . In addition,  is sequentially
rational with respect to  if, taking  as given, no player prefers to change its strategy i at
any of its information sets.
Of these two conditions for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the rst condition, reason-
ability, might lead it to being incapable of satisfying the weak consistency and the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium condition in general multi-period games with observed actions. To
be precise, the incapability of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is caused by the weakness of
Bayesrule. Bayesrule is a way of formulating a conditional probability or a conditional
probability density function and denes them as a fraction between two probabilities or a
fraction between two probability density functions. So, Bayesrule can be employed only
when the probability of a given event, which becomes a denominator in the fraction, is pos-
itive or when the probability density functions are well-dened. This limited application of
Bayesrule consequently gives rise to the incapability of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
general games.
To clearly see this incapability of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we formally extend
the denition of the reasonability into general multi-period games with observed actions.
Notice that, in this extension, we omit the no-signaling-what-you-dont-know condition
for simplicitys sake. This condition was designed to improve the reasonability condition
so that this reasonability condition might become as plausible as the consistency condition
introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982). As shown by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994,
234.3), however, the reasonability condition including the no-signaling-what-you-dont-know
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condition is fundamentally di¤erent from the consistency condition. Hence, we conclude that
its contribution to the reasonability condition is not su¢ cient compared with the complexity
caused by this condition7 . As a result, we simplify the denition of the reasonability in
general games by excluding this no-signaling-what-you-dont-know condition. We call this
simple extension of the reasonability reasonable consistency.
Denition 2 An assessment (; ) is reasonably consistent if given each i, 1) 1i is the
same as  i and 2) for each (i; a
1; :::; at 1) 2 iA1  At 1 and each B 2 j 6=iß(j),
ti(i; a
1; :::; at 1;B) indicates the same probability asR
 i
R
fat 1gIB( i)
t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)t 1i (i; a
1; :::; at 2; d i)R
 i
R
fat 1g
t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)t 1i (i; a1; :::; at 2; d i)
whenever t  2 and R
 i
R
fat 1g
t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)t 1i (i; a
1; :::; at 2; d i) > 0 where
IB() is an indicator function, i:e: IB( i) = 1 if  i 2 B and IB( i) = 0 if  i =2 B.
In other words, an assessment (; ) is reasonably consistent if 1) in the rst period, each
player correctly forms its beliefs 1i based on the type and state probability measure , and
2) from the second period, each player employs Bayes rule to update its beliefs ti with
respect to the previous action plans t 1 and the previous beliefs t 1i whenever possible.
Here, whenever possiblemeans whenever an information set  i f(i; a1; :::; at 1)g is
reached with positive probability with respect to t 1 and t 1i , that is,
R
 i
R
fat 1g
t 1(; a1;
:::; at 2; dat 1)t 1i (i; a
1; :::; at 2; d i) > 0. Note that, in nite games, this denition of the
reasonable consistency represents the same condition as the denition of the reasonability in
7 According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), this condition requires that no player is deviation be
treated as containing information about things that player i does not know.Here, player is deviationis
its behavior o¤ the equilibrium path, so this condition places restrictions on the beliefs o¤ the equilibrium
path. However, the incapability problem with a perfect Bayesian equilibrium occurs more signicantly on
the equilibrium path than o¤ the equilibrium path. Therefore, this condition cannot solve the problem with
the solution concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This is another reason why we conclude that the
contribution of this condition is not su¢ cient.
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Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Denition 3.1) except for the no-signaling-what-you-dont-know
condition.
There is another version of Bayesrule, a continuous version of Bayesrule, but we cannot
use this version to extend the denition of the reasonability into general multi-period games
with observed actions. A continuous version of Bayesrule denes a conditional probability
density function as a fraction between two probability density functions. Accordingly, this
version requires well-dened probability density functions. In general games with a contin-
uum of actions, however, only mixed strategies that assign zero probability to every single
action can be represented as probability density functions. As a result, this version of Bayes
rule is not well-dened for any strategies that assign positive probability to a single action.
In particular, this version is not well-dened for any of the pure strategies under which
players would play a single action at each information set. Therefore, we cannot extend the
denition of the reasonability into general games by using this continuous version of Bayes
rule8 .
Based on the reasonable consistency condition, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is extended
in general multi-period games with observed actions. We call this simple extension of the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Denition 3 An assessment (; ) is a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium if (; )
8 There is a way to combine these two versions of Bayes rule. This way does not solve the limited
application problem with Bayes rule in general games, either. This is because it requires well-dened
probability or probability density functions. In general games, however, players strategies might induce
neither probability nor a probability density function. For example, the senders strategy introduced in the
next subsection induces neither probability nor a probability density function. As a result, this combined
version of Bayesrule still has limited application, and therefore it could result in the incapability of a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in general games.
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is both 1) reasonably consistent and 2) sequentially rational9 .
3.2 Example
Now, we are ready to exemplify the incapability of a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
a general multi-period game with observed actions. Consider the information transmission
game introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982). There are two players, a sender and a
receiver. The sender is assigned a type  that is a random variable from a uniform distribution
on [0; 1] and she makes a signal s 2 [0; 1] to the receiver. Then, after observing the signal
s, the receiver chooses his action a 2 [0; 1]. The sender has a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function US(; a; b) =  (   (a + b))2 where b > 0 and the receiver has another von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function UR(; a) =  (   a)2.
In this game, the senders strategy s() =  and the receivers strategy a(s) = maxfs 
b; 0g are a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium together with the receivers system of beliefs
(maxfs  b; 0g; s) = 1 which denotes that given a signal s, the type maxfs  b; 0g would be
assigned to the sender with probability one. First, the system of beliefs (maxfs  b; 0g; s)
= 1 is reasonably consistent with the senders strategy s() =  because it does not violate
the conditions for the reasonable consistency in Denition 2. Under the strategy s() = ,
each signal  occurs with probability zero, and thus we cannot employ Bayesrule. In this
case, no system of beliefs is considered to violate Bayes rule formulated in Denition 2.
Consequently, (maxfs   b; 0g; s) = 1 is reasonably consistent with s() = . Second, the
senders strategy s() =  is the best response to the receivers strategy a(s) = maxfs b; 0g,
9 For a formal denition of the sequential rationality, please refer to Denition 5 in Section 4.
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and a(s) = maxfs   b; 0g is the best response to his system of beliefs (maxfs   b; 0g; s)
= 1. This proves that they satisfy the sequential rationality. Therefore, these strategies and
the system of beliefs are a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
This simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium, however, is incapable of satisfying the weak
consistency and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition. In the scenario of this
equilibrium, the receiver constantly mistakes a true type  for a wrong typemaxf b; 0g. As
a result, the senders strategy s() =  and the receivers system of beliefs (maxfs b; 0g; s)
= 1 do not induce the same probability distribution on the equilibrium path which the players
would actually reach if they were to play according to their strategies s() and a(). Since
the weak consistency10 requires them both to induce the same probability distribution on
the equilibrium path, this simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not satisfy the weak
consistency. Moreover, the receivers strategy a(s) = maxfs  b; 0g is not the best response
to the senders strategy s() = . So this simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not
satisfy the Nash equilibrium condition, and thus it does not satisfy the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium condition11 .
This incapability of the simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium is caused mainly by the
10 Denition 7 in Section 5 formally denes this weak consistency in general multi-period games with
observed actions.
11 Crawford and Sobel (1982) tried to solve this problem with a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium
by adopting a continuous version of Bayes rule. Their approach to the problem naturally led them to
only consider the probability density strategies of the sender. That is, they did not consider the overall
strategies of the sender. Their partial consideration of the senders strategies might be justied by Lemma
1 in their paper which guaranteed that, in equilibrium, any senders strategy can be replaced with her
probability density strategies while preserving the strategies of the receiver. Lemma 1, however, was not
proven correctly, and thus it cannot justify their partial consideration of the senders strategies or any other
results. For more information, please refer to Jung (2009).
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setting12 that the sender has a continuum of types and signals. Accordingly, most games
having similar settings can testify that there exist simple perfect Bayesian equilibria that
break the weak consistency and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition. Since
this setting represents a usual situation, there is a large class of games including similar
settings. Therefore, we conclude that this incapability is a ubiquitous problem with the
solution concept of the simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the next section, we revise
this simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium to develop a solution concept that is capable of
satisfying both the weak consistency and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition.
4 Perfect Regular Equilibrium
The incapability of a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium is due to the limited application
of Bayesrule in general multi-period games with observed actions. Bayesrule cannot be
employed if a conditional event, whose probability becomes a denominator in a conditional
probability formula according to Bayesrule, takes place with probability zero. In general
games, however, it is possible for every conditional event to take place with probability zero.
In this case, we cannot employ Bayesrule at all either on the equilibrium path or o¤ the
equilibrium path. Hence, no system of beliefs is considered to violate Bayesrule, which
means that every system of beliefs satises the reasonable consistency for a simple perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. As a result, some intuitively inconsistent system of beliefs could be
part of a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and this system of beliefs could lead the simple
12 Jung (2010) showed that, under this setting, an extension of the sequential equilibrium in general games
can cause the same problem, namely, the incapability to satisfy both the weak consistency and the Nash
equilibrium condition.
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perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the incapability as shown in the example.
To solve this incapability problem with the simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we revise
it by replacing Bayesrule with a regular version of the conditional probability and refer to
the revised solution concept as a perfect regular equilibrium. The regular version of the con-
ditional probability is another way of formulating a conditional probability and is especially
designed to well-dene the probability given probability zero events. It therefore denes a
conditional probability implicitly through a functional equation without referring to a frac-
tion between probabilities of events. Accordingly, it does not show the limited application
problem as Bayesrule does, and it can well-dene the conditional probabilities given almost
everyprobability zero event. Therefore, the perfect regular equilibrium equipped with this
regular conditional probability13 can solve the incapability problem with the simple perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
The denition of the perfect regular equilibrium is the same as that of the simple perfect
Bayesian equilibrium except for its approach to the conditional probabilities. Thus, the
perfect regular equilibrium is dened as an assessment (; ) such that 1)  is updated
from period to period with respect to  and  itself according to the regular conditional
probability, and 2) taking  as given, no player prefers to change its strategy i at any of
its information sets. The rst condition for the perfect regular equilibrium is referred to as
regular consistency and the second condition is referred to as the sequential rationality. In
this section, we formally dene these conditions and the perfect regular equilibrium.
13 For more information regarding the regular version of the conditional probability, please refer to Ash
(1972, 6.6).
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We rst provide a formal denition of the regular consistency in general multi-period
games with observed actions.
Denition 4 An assessment (; ) is regularly consistent if given each i, 1) 1i is the
same as  i and 2) for each t  2 and each (i; a1; :::; at 2) 2 iA1At 2, ti satises
the following functional equation:
R
B
R
A
t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)t 1i (i; a
1; :::; at 2; d i) =R
 i
R
A
ti(i; a
1; :::; at 1;B)t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)t 1i (i; a
1; :::; at 2; d i) for every B 2
j 6=iß(j) and A 2 Ii=1ß(At 1i ).
That is, an assessment (; ) is regularly consistent if 1) in the rst period, each player
correctly forms its beliefs 1i based on the type and state probability measure , and 2) from
the second period, each player employs the regular conditional probability to update its
beliefs ti with respect to the previous action plans 
t 1 and the previous beliefs t 1i given
the information about its type and the previous actions (i; a1; :::; at 2). Here, Denition
4 implicitly denes ti as a regular conditional probability measure through the functional
equation governed by t 1 and t 1i . In this way, Denition 4 can avoid the limited applica-
tion problem since the functional equation is well-dened for any arbitrary set B f(i; a1;
:::; at 2)g A where B 2 j 6=iß(j) and A 2 Ii=1ß(At 1i ). As a result, beliefs ti can be
properly updated with respect to t 1 and t 1i . Note that the functional equation can de-
termine a conditional probability of ti only within the support
14 of the product measure of
t 1 and t 1i . This is because if a set A 2 Ii=1ß(At 1i ) is outside the support of the product
measure t 1t 1i , then both sides in the functional equation become zero, and so the con-
ditional probability of ti given A can be arbitrary. Consequently, a conditional probability
of ti is only meaningful given a set of actions within the support of the product measure
14 In a metric space, a support of a measure is dened as the smallest closed set within which the measure
lives.
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t 1t 1i .
Next, we formally dene the sequential rationality in general games. For notational
simplicity, given a player i and a period t, let a functional Eti : i  A1     At 1 
	  ! R (= R [ f 1;1g) be a conditional expected utility functional15 where 	
is the set of all assessments. That is, for each (i; a1; :::; at 1) 2 i  A1      At 1,
Eti (i; a
1; :::; at 1;; ) denotes an expected utility value with respect to the system of beliefs 
and the strategy prole  conditional on reaching the information set  if(i; a1; :::; at 1)g.
Denition 5 A strategy prole  is sequentially rational with respect to a system of beliefs
 if, given each i and t, and given each (i; a1; :::; at 1) 2 i  A1      At 1, we have
Eti (i; a
1; :::; at 1;; )  Eti (i; a1; :::; at 1;; (0i;  i)) for every 0i 2 i.
Here, a set  i  f(i; a1; :::; at 1)g denotes an information set of player i. Thus, the
sequential rationality requires that, in responding to the other playersstrategies  i, each
player i make its best response i with respect to the system of beliefs , which would induce
the greatest expected utility value given any of its information sets  if(i; a1; :::; at 1)g.
15 Formally, the conditional expected utility functional is implicitly dened just like the expected utility
functional. So, given i and t, the conditional expected utility functional Eti is a unique function satisfying
the following conditions for any arbitrary strategy prole . First, if Eti ( _i; _a
1; :::; _at 1;; ) is nite, then, for
any " > 0, there exist both a period t0 2 ft; :::; Tg and a sequence of actions (at0+1; :::; aT ) 2 At0+1  AT
such that for any t00  t0,
j Eti ( _i; _a1; :::; _at 1;; ) 
R
 i
R
At
   R
At00Ui(
_i;  i; _a1; :::; _at 1; at; :::; at
00
; at
00+1; :::;
aT )t
00
( _i;  i; _a1; :::; at
00 1; dat
00
)    t( _i;  i; _a1; :::; _at 1; dat)ti( _i; _a1; :::; _at 1; d i) j< ".
Second, if Eti ( _i; _a
1; :::; _at 1;; ) is innite, then, for any M 2 N, there exist both a period t0 2 ft; :::; Tg
and a sequence of actions (at
0+1; :::; aT ) 2 At0+1     AT such that for any t00  t0,R
 i
R
At
   R
At00Ui(
_i;  i; _a1; :::; _at 1; at; :::; at
00
; at
00+1; :::; aT )t
00
( _i;  i; _a1;
:::; at
00 1; dat
00
)    t( _i;  i; _a1; :::; _at 1; dat)ti( _i; _a1; :::; _at 1; d i)
> M when Eti ( _i; _a
1; :::; _at 1;; ) =1 and <  M when Eti ( _i; _a1; :::; _at 1;; ) =  1.
Again, this denition of the conditional expected utility functional makes sense according to Ash (1972, 2.6).
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As a result, no player prefers to change its strategy at any of its information sets. Originally,
Kreps and Wilson (1982) dened the sequential rationality in nite games. We adapt their
denition to general multi-period games with observed actions.
Finally, Denition 6 denes the perfect regular equilibrium.
Denition 6 An assessment (; ) is a perfect regular equilibrium if (; ) is both 1)
regularly consistent and 2) sequentially rational.
5 Properties of the perfect regular equilibrium
The rst property of the perfect regular equilibrium is that it always satises the weak
consistency, which is a criterion of the rational beliefs. Since the weak consistency was
originally dened in nite games, we start by extending its denition to general multi-period
games with observed actions.
Denition 7 An assessment (; ) is weakly consistent16 if given each i, 1) 1i is the
same as  i and 2) for each t  2, ti satises the following functional equation:
R

R
A1
  R
At 1IBA(; a
1; :::; at 1)t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)   1(; da1)(d) = R

R
A1
  R
At 1IA(i; a
1;
:::; at 1)ti(i; a
1; :::; at 1;B)t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)1(; da1)(d) for every B 2 j 6=iß(j)
and A 2ß(i)  (t 1t0=1Ii0=1ß(At
0
i0)) where IBA() and IA() are indicator functions, i:e:
IBA(; a1; :::; at 1) = 1 if (; a1; :::; at 1) 2 B  A and IBA(; a1; :::; at 1) = 0 otherwise.
In plain words, an assessment (; ) is weakly consistent if 1) in the rst period, each
player correctly forms its beliefs 1i based on the type and state probability measure , and
2) from the second period, each player employs the regular conditional probability to update
its beliefs ti with respect to all the previous action plans 
1, ...,t 1 and the probability
measure  given the information about its type and the previous actions (i; a1; :::; at 1).
16 We adapt Myersons (1991, 4.3) denition to general multi-period games with observed actions.
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In this denition, the functional equation can determine a conditional probability of ti
only on the equilibrium path. This is because if a set A 2 Ii=1ß(At 1i ) is o¤ the equilibrium
path, then both sides in the functional equation become zero, so a conditional probability of
ti given A can be arbitrary. Consequently, this denition indicates that the weak consistency
imposes restrictions only on the beliefs on the equilibrium path, and thus it imposes no
restriction on the beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Note that the regular consistency places
restrictions on the beliefs on the support of the product measure t 1t 1i , which includes
all the beliefs on the equilibrium path. As a result, in general multi-period games with
observed actions, if an assessment satises the regular consistency, then it also satises the
weak consistency. This statement is formulated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If an assessment is regularly consistent, then it is weakly consistent.
Proof. The result directly follows from the denitions.
Kreps and Ramey (1987) introduced another criterion of the rational beliefs, convex
structural consistency. According to them, the convex structural consistency is dened as a
consistency criterion under which the beliefs of the players should reect the informational
structure of a game through a convex combination of playersstrategies. Thus, under this
consistency criterion, if players would be unexpectedly located, they should then form their
beliefs such that a convex combination of strategies can induce the beliefs17 . This criterion
17 In fact, this convex structural consistency is a weak version of the structural consistency of Kreps and
Wilson (1982). Kreps and Wilson dened the structural consistency as a consistency criterion under which
the beliefs of the players should reect the informational structure of a game through a single strategy prole.
Thus, this structural consistency requires players to use only one strategy prole to form one belief. Because
of the strong requirement, however, most of the solution concepts including the sequential equilibrium and
the perfect equilibrium do not satisfy this criterion even in nite games.
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of the rational beliefs imposes restrictions on all the beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path as well
as on the equilibrium path. Note that the perfect regular equilibrium, just like the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in nite games, places restrictions only on the beliefs on the support
of the product measure t 1t 1i . Since the support of the product measure 
t 1t 1i might
not cover all the beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, the perfect regular equilibrium might not
put restrictions on all the beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Accordingly, the perfect regular
equilibrium might not satisfy the convex structural consistency18 .
The second property of the perfect regular equilibrium is that it always satises the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition, which is a criterion of the rational strategies.
This property is due to the sequential rationality, which is one of the two conditions for the
perfect regular equilibrium. If an information set initiates a subgame, then the conditional
probability on the information set given the information set itself is uniquely determined
as one. Then, the sequential rationality condition, given the information set, becomes the
same as the Nash equilibrium condition, which means that the perfect regular equilibrium
induces a Nash equilibrium in the subgame. As a result, the perfect regular equilibrium
satises the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition. Proposition 2 formally presents
this second property of the perfect regular equilibrium in general multi-period games with
observed actions.
Proposition 2 Every perfect regular equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The result directly follows from the denitions.
18 Jung (2010) introduced a new solution concept, complete sequential equilibrium, in general nite-period
games with observed actions and presented conditions under which the complete sequential equilibrium
satises the convex structural consistency.
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Next, Proposition 3 reveals the relationship between the regular consistency for the per-
fect regular equilibrium and the reasonable consistency for the simple perfect Bayesian equi-
librium in nite games. In general games, Bayesrule in the reasonable consistency might
give rise to the incapability problem with a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In nite
games, however, Bayesrule does not cause this problem, and it functions as well as the
regular conditional probability does. As a result, the reasonable consistency based on Bayes
rule is equivalent to the regular consistency based on the regular conditional probability in
nite games.
Proposition 3 In nite games, an assessment is regularly consistent if and only if it is
reasonably consistent.
Proof. The result directly follows from the denitions.
Finally, Theorem 1 aggregates all the results. Propositions 1 and 2 together ensure that
the perfect regular equilibrium satises both conditions, namely, the weak consistency and
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition, which we have suggested as criteria of
rational solution concepts in general games. So, we conclude that the perfect regular equi-
librium successfully extends the perfect Bayesian equilibrium to general games. In addition,
Proposition 3 guarantees that the perfect regular equilibrium is equivalent to the simple
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in nite games. Note that the simple perfect Bayesian equi-
librium is dened as a simple version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Therefore, as a
corollary of these propositions, Theorem 1 brings all the properties of the perfect regular
equilibrium together and provides evidence that it is indeed an extended and simple version
of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-period games with observed actions.
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Theorem 1 Every perfect regular equilibrium satises both the weak consistency and the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium condition. Furthermore, in nite games, an assessment
(; ) is a perfect regular equilibrium if and only if it is a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
There is another solution concept for general games. Jung (2010) developed complete
sequential equilibria in general nite-period games with observed actions by improving se-
quential equilibria. In general games, the sequential equilibrium might give rise to the inca-
pability problem as in the case of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The complete sequential
equilibrium solves this incapability problem by replacing beliefs with complete beliefs. The
complete beliefs are probability measures dened, not on each information set, but on the
whole class of information sets in each period. Note that all strategy proles lead to the
whole class of information sets in each period with probability one and thus they can well-
dene probability distributions over the whole class of information sets. As a result, any
arbitrary strategy prole can properly induce consistent complete beliefs, and therefore the
complete sequential equilibrium can improve the sequential equilibrium in general games.
This complete sequential equilibrium, however, is not closely related to the perfect regular
equilibrium in general games in that it might not be a perfect regular equilibrium and vice
versa. This is because the consistency for the complete sequential equilibrium and the
regular consistency for the perfect regular equilibrium place di¤erent restrictions on the
beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Consequently, a complete sequential equilibrium might not
be a perfect regular equilibrium in general games and a perfect regular equilibrium might
not be a complete sequential equilibrium either.
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